Given an instance I of the classical Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete preference lists (smi), a maximum cardinality matching can be larger than a stable matching. In many large-scale applications of smi, we seek to match as many agents as possible. This motivates the problem of finding a maximum cardinality matching in I that admits the smallest number of blocking pairs (so is "as stable as possible"). We show that this problem is NP-hard and not approximable within n 1−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP, where n is the number of men in I. Further, even if all preference lists are of length at most 3, we show that the problem remains NP-hard and not approximable within δ, for some δ > 1. By contrast, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for the case where the preference lists of one sex are of length at most 2.
Introduction
The Stable Marriage problem (sm) was introduced in the seminal paper of Gale and Shapley [6] . In its classical form, an instance of sm involves n men and n women, each of whom specifies a preference list, which is a total order on the members of the opposite sex. A matching M is a set of (man,woman) pairs such that each person belongs to exactly one pair. If (m, w) ∈ M , we say that w is m's partner in M , and vice versa, and we write M (m) = w, M (w) = m.
A person x prefers y to y if y precedes y on x's preference list. A matching M is stable if it admits no blocking pair, namely a (man,woman) pair (m, w) such that m prefers w to M (m) and w prefers m to M (w). Gale and Shapley [6] proved that every instance of sm admits at least one stable matching, and described an algorithm -the Gale / Shapley algorithm -that finds such a matching in time that is linear in the input size. In general, there may be many stable matchings (in fact exponentially many in n) for a given instance of sm [11] .
Incomplete lists. A variety of extensions of the basic problem have been studied. In the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (smi), the numbers of men and women need not be the same, and each person's preference list consists of a subset of the members of the opposite sex in strict order. A (man,woman) pair (m, w) is acceptable if each member of the pair appears on the preference list of the other. A matching M is now a set of acceptable pairs such that each person belongs to at most one pair. In this context, (m, w) is a blocking pair for a matching M if (a) (m, w) is an acceptable pair, (b) m is either unmatched or prefers w to M (m), and likewise (c) w is either unmatched or prefers m to M (w). Given the definitions of a matching and a blocking pair, we lose no generality by assuming that the preference lists are consistent (i.e., given a (man,woman) pair (m, w), m appears on the preference list of w if and only if w appears on the preference list of m). As in the classical case, there is always at least one stable matching for an instance of smi, and it is straightforward to extend the Gale / Shapley algorithm to give a linear-time algorithm for this case. Again, there may be many different stable matchings, but Gale and Sotomayor [7] showed that every stable matching for a given smi instance has the same size and matches exactly the same set of people.
Motivation. The Hospitals/Residents problem (hr) is a many-to-one generalisation of smi, so called because of its applications in centralised matching schemes that handle the allocation of graduating medical students, or residents, to hospitals [19] . The largest such scheme is the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) [23] in the US, but similar schemes exist in Canada [24] , in Scotland [10, 25] , and in a variety of other countries and contexts.
In the 2006-07 run of the Scottish medical matching scheme, called the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS), there were 781 students and 53 hospitals, with total capacity 789. The matching algorithm (designed and implemented at the Department of Computing Science, University of Glasgow) found a stable matching of size 744, thus leaving 37 students unmatched. Clearly stability is the key property to be satisfied, and it is this that restricts the size of the resultant matching. Nevertheless the administrators asked whether, were the stability criterion to have been relaxed, a larger matching could have been found. We found that a matching of size 781 did exist, but the matching we computed admitted 400 blocking pairs.
"Almost stable" maximum matchings. In practical situations, a blocking pair of a given matching M need not always lead to M being undermined, since the agents involved might be unaware of their potential to improve relative to M . For example, in situations where preference lists are not public knowledge, there may be limited channels of communication that would lead to the awareness of blocking pairs in practice. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assert that the greater the number of blocking pairs of a given matching M , the greater the likelihood that M would be undermined by a pair of agents in practice. In particular, a maximum cardinality matching (henceforth a maximum matching) for the 2006-07 SFAS data that admits only 10 blocking pairs might be considered to be "more stable" than one with 400 blocking pairs. This motivates the problem of finding a maximum matching that admits the smallest number of blocking pairs (and is therefore, in the sense described above, "as stable as possible"). Eriksson and Häggström [5] also argue that counting the number of blocking pairs of a matching can be an effective way to measure its degree of instability; earlier, this approach had already been taken by Khuller et al. [13] .
Further applications. Further practical applications of "almost stable" maximum matchings arise in similar bipartite settings, where the size of the matching may be considered to be a higher priority than its stability in a particular matching market. Examples include school placement [1] and the allocation of students to projects in a university department [3] . Furthermore, the US Navy has a bipartite matching problem involving the assignment of sailors to billets [17, 22] in which every sailor should be matched to a billet, and meanwhile there are some critical billets that cannot be left vacant.
In non-bipartite contexts, applications arise in kidney exchange settings [21, 26] , for example. Here, both the size and the stability of a matching have been considered as being the most important criteria. Centralised programs have been organised in many countries to match incompatible patient-donor pairs, including the US, the Netherlands and the UK. In most programs, the main goal is to maximise the number of transplants (i.e., the first priority is to find a maximum matching) [21] . However other studies [20] consider stability as the first priority. Another example in a non-bipartite setting involves pairing up chess players [14] .
Our results. In this paper we present a range of algorithmic results for max size min bp smi, the problem of finding a maximum matching with the smallest number of blocking pairs, given an instance of smi. We firstly show in Section 2 that this problem is NP-hard and not approximable within n 1−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP. We then consider special cases of the problem where the preference lists on one or both sides are short (this is motivated in practice by applications such as SFAS, where students are asked to rank six hospitals in order of preference). We show in Section 3 that, even when preference lists on both sides are of length at most 3, max card min bp smi is NP-hard and not approximable within δ, for some δ > 1, unless P=NP. On the other hand, for the case where the lists on one side are of length at most 2 (and the lists on the other side are unbounded in length), in Section 4, we give a polynomial-time algorithm for max card min bp smi. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
Related work. Matchings with few blocking pairs have previously been studied from an algorithmic point of view in the context of the Stable Roommates problem (sr), a nonbipartite generalisation of sm, as a means of coping with the fact that, in contrast to the case for sm, an sr instance need not admit a stable matching. Abraham et al. [2] showed that, given an sr instance, the problem of finding a matching with the smallest number of blocking pairs is NP-hard and not approximable within n 1/2−ε , for any ε > 0, unless P=NP. In the case that preference lists include ties, the lower bound was strengthened to n 1−ε . On the other hand, given a fixed integer K, they showed that the problem of finding a matching with exactly K blocking pairs, or reporting that no such matching exists, is solvable in polynomial time. This paper can be viewed as a counterpart of [2] , strengthening its results by moving to the bipartite setting, and answering the remaining previously open questions in a table shown in Section 5.
Unbounded length preference lists
Before presenting the main result of this section, we define some notation and terminology relating to matchings and graphs. Given an instance I of smi, let M denote the set of matchings in I and let M + denote the set of maximum matchings in I. Given a matching M ∈ M, let bp I (M ) denote the set of blocking pairs with respect to M in I (we omit the subscript when the instance is clear from the context). Let bp + (I) = min{|bp I (M )| : M ∈ M + }. Define max size min bp smi to be the problem of finding, given an smi instance I, a matching M ∈ M + such that |bp I (M )| = bp + (I).
Given a graph G, the subdivision graph of G, denoted by S(G), is a bipartite graph obtained by subdividing each edge {u, w} of G in order to obtain two edges {u, v} and {v, w} of S(G), where v is a new vertex. A matching M in a graph G is said to be maximal if no proper superset of M is a matching in G. Let β(G) denote the size of a maximum matching in G. Define exact-mm to be the problem of deciding, given a graph G and integer K, whether G admits a maximal matching of size exactly K. exact-mm is NP-complete, even for subdivision graphs of cubic graphs [16, Lemma 2.2.1]. We now present a gap-introducing reduction from exact-mm to max size min bp smi.
Theorem 1. max size min bp smi is not approximable within n 1−ε , where n is the number of men in a given instance, for any ε > 0, unless P=NP.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given. We transform from exact-mm restricted to subdivision graphs of cubic graphs, which is NP-complete as noted above. Hence let G = (V, E) (a subdivision graph of some cubic graph G ) and K (a positive integer) be an instance of exact-mm. Then G is a bipartite graph, and V is a disjoint union of two sets U and W , where each edge e ∈ E joins a vertex in U to a vertex in W . Let m = |E|. We lose no generality by assuming that K ≤ β(G) ≤ min{|U |, |W |}. Suppose that U = {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n 1 } and W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n 2 }. Without loss of generality assume that each vertex in U has degree 2 and each vertex in W has degree 3. For each u i ∈ U , let w p i and w q i be the two neighbours of u i in G, where p i < q i . Also, for each w j ∈ W , let u r j , u s j and u t j , be the three neighbours of w j , where r j < s j < t j . Let B = 3 ε and let C = (n 1 + n 2 ) B+1 − (n 1 + n 2 ) + 1. We create an instance I of smi as follows. The sets of men and women in I are denoted by U and W respectively, where U and W are as defined in Figure 1 . It follows that |U| = |W| = 3n 1 
Preference lists for the men and women in I are as shown in Figure 2 . In a given person's preference list, the symbol [S] denotes all members of the set S listed in some arbitrary strict order at the point where the symbol appears, and the symbol [[S] ] denotes all members of S listed in increasing subscript order at the point where the symbol appears.
We now give some intuition behind this construction. Suppose that M is a maximal matching of size K in G. For each {u i , w j } ∈ M , the relevant pair in U i × W j (who rank each other in second place) will be added to a matching M in I. The n 1 − K men in U (respectively n 2 − K women in W ) who are unmatched in M are collectively matched in M to the women in Y (respectively men in X). The remaining members of U i (for each u i ∈ U ) and W j (for each w j ∈ W ) are collectively matched in M to the members of Z i and V j respectively. Each of U × Z i and V j × W contributes one blocking pair to M . It is then possible to extend M to a perfect matching in I without introducing any additional blocking pairs by adding a perfect matching between the members of G i,j ∪ H i,j for each {u i , w j } ∈ E. Hence |bp(M )| = n 1 + n 2 . Conversely, from a perfect matching M in I, it is straightforward to extract a matching M in G of size K. If M is not maximal then there is some u i ∈ U and w j ∈ W , both unmatched in M , such that {u i , w j } ∈ E. In this case, for each c
i,j , w 1 j ) ∈ bp(M ), and hence |bp(M )| ≥ C. This introduces the required 'gap' for the inapproximability result.
For the formal argument showing the correctness of the reduction, we firstly show that I admits a perfect matching. As K ≤ β(G), it follows that G admits a matching M of size K. We form a matching M in I as follows. Consider each edge {u i , w j } ∈ E. Suppose firstly that {u i , w j } ∈ M , where u i ∈ U and w j ∈ W. Let σ = 1, 2 according as w j is w p i or w q i respectively, and let τ = 1, 2, 3 according as u i is u r j , u s j or u t j respectively. Add
It may be verified that M is a perfect matching in I.
We now show that if G admits a maximal matching of size K, then bp(I) ≤ n 1 + n 2 . For, suppose that G admits a maximal matching M of size K. As above, we form a perfect matching M in I. We now show that |bp(M )| = n 1 + n 2 . For, let 1 ≤ i ≤ n 1 be given. Exactly one of (
Then u i is unmatched in M , so that by the maximality of M in G, each of w p i and w q i is matched in M . Hence any h c,d
i,j whom u 1 i prefers to y b is matched in M to her first-choice partner, so that (
But by construction of M , it follows that (u 1 i , y b ) ∈ M for some i < i, and hence y b prefers u 1 i to u 1 i , a contradiction. Now let {u i , w j } ∈ E. It is straightforward to verify that no pair of the form (g
In the latter case i < i, so that (
We next show that if G admits no maximal matching of size K then bp(I) > (n 1 + n 2 ) B+1 . Suppose that G admits no maximal matching of size K. Let M be an arbitrary perfect matching in I. We claim that |bp(M )| > (n 1 + n 2 ) B+1 . Firstly we note that, for
i is unmatched in M , a contradiction. Finally by the hypothesis, M is not maximal in G. Hence there exists some {u i , w j } ∈ E such that no edge of M is incident to either u i or w j . By construction of M it follows that (
Hence the existence of a (n 1 + n 2 ) B -approximation algorithm for max size min bp smi implies a polynomial-time algorithm for exact-mm in subdivision graphs of cubic graphs, a contradiction unless P=NP. We claim that (n 1 + n 2 ) B ≥ n 1−ε . For, we firstly observe that n = 3n 1 + 2mC + 4n 2 − K. Now G is the subdivision graph of a cubic graph G , and n 1 is the number of edges in G , so 2n 1 = 3n 2 . Also m = 2n 1 . It follows that
From Equation 1, we may deduce that n ≤ 3(n 1 + n 2 ) B+2 , and hence
By hypothesis K ≤ min{n 1 , n 2 }, and without loss of generality we may assume that n 1 ≥ 3; hence Equation 1 also implies that n ≥ 3 B , and hence 3
ε , and hence Inequality 2 implies that (n 1 + n 2 ) B ≥ n 1−ε as required.
Let max size exact bp smi denote the problem of finding, given an smi instance I and an integer K , a matching M ∈ M + such that |bp I (M )| = K .
Corollary 2. max size exact bp smi is NP-complete.
Proof. We use the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 1 and set K = n 1 + n 2 and ε = ∞ (i.e. B = 0 and C = 1). As before G has a maximal matching of size K if and only if I admits a perfect matching M such that |bp(M )| ≤ K . However it is straightforward to verify that any perfect matching M in I satisfies |bp(M )| ≥ K , and hence the result follows.
Given that smi is a special case of sr, we may reuse results from [2] to obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 3 ([2]
). max size exact bp smi is solvable in polynomial time when K is fixed.
Preference lists of length at most 3
In this section we consider the case where preference lists in a given instance I of smi are of bounded length. Given two integers p and q, let max size min bp (p, q)-smi denote the restriction of max size min bp smi in which each man's preference list is of length at most p, and each woman's list is of length at most q. We use p = ∞ or q = ∞ to denote the possibility that the men's lists or women's lists are of unbounded length, respectively.
We begin by showing that max size min bp (3, 3)-smi is NP-hard and not approximable within some δ > 1 unless P=NP. To prove this, we give a reduction from a restricted version of sat. Given a Boolean formula B in CNF and a truth assignment f , let t(f ) denote the number of clauses of B satisfied simultaneously by f , and let t(B) denote the maximum value of t(f ), taken over all truth assignments f of B. Let max (2,2)-e3-sat [4] denote the problem of finding, given a Boolean formula B in CNF in which each clause contains exactly 3 literals and each variable occurs exactly twice as an unnegated literal in B and exactly twice as a negated literal in B, a truth assignment f such that t(f ) = t(B). B. Also |c j | = 3 for each c j ∈ C. We form an instance I of max size min bp smi as follows. The set of men in I is X ∪ P ∪ Q and the set of women in I is Y ∪ C ∪ Z, where
The preference lists of the men and women in I are shown in Figure 3 . In the preference list of an agent x 4i+r ∈ X (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and r ∈ {0, 1}), the symbol c(x 4i+r ) denotes the woman c s j ∈ C such that the (r + 1)th occurrence of v i appears at position s of c j . Similarly if r ∈ {2, 3} then the symbol c(x 4i+r ) denotes the woman c s j ∈ C such that the (r − 1)th occurrence ofv i appears at position s of c j . Also in the preference list of an agent c s j ∈ C , if literal v i appears at position s of clause c j ∈ C, the symbol x(c s j ) denotes the man x 4i+r−1 where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second occurrence of literal v i in B, otherwise if literalv i appears at position s of clause c j ∈ C, the symbol x(c s j ) denotes the man x 4i+r+1 where r = 1, 2 according as this is the first or second occurrence of literalv i in B. Clearly each preference list is of length at most 3.
For each i (0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1), let T i = {(x 4i+r , y 4i+r ) : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3} and F i = {(x 4i+r , y 4i+r+1 )} : 0 ≤ r ≤ 3}, where addition is taken module 4i. We firstly note that M is a perfect matching of the men and women in I, where
We now give some intuition behind this construction. The people in X i ∪Y i correspond to variable v i ∈ V , whilst the people in P j ∪ {q j , c 1 j , c 2 j , c 3 j , z j } correspond to clause c j ∈ C. The pairs in T i are added to a matching M in I if v i ∈ V is true under a truth assignment f of B, otherwise the pairs in F i are added to M . Crucially, if v i is false under f then each of x 4i and x 4i+1 (corresponding to the first and second occurrences of literal v i ) has his third choice in M . Similarly if v i is true under f then each of x 4i+2 and x 4i+3 (corresponding to the first and second occurrences of literalv i ) has his third choice in M . Hence if any clause c j is false under f , then since (q j , c s j ) ∈ M for some s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, it follows that (x(c s j ), c s j ) ∈ bp(M ). Additionally, regardless of the truth values of V under f , the members of X i × Y i contribute one blocking pair for each v i ∈ V , as do the members of P j × C for each c j ∈ C.
For the formal argument showing the correctness of the reduction, we claim that t(B)+ bp + (I) = n + 2m.
For, let f be a truth assignment of B such that t(f ) = t(B). We create a perfect matching M in I as follows. For each variable v i ∈ V , if v i is true under f , add the pairs in T i to M , otherwise add the pairs in F i to M . In the former case,
Now let c j ∈ C. If c j contains a literal that is true under f , let s ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the position of c j in which this literal occurs, otherwise set s = 1. Add the pairs (p t j , c t j ) (1 ≤ t = s ≤ 3), (p s j , z j ) and (q j , c s j ) to M . Then bp(M ) ∩ (P j × C ) = {(p s j , c s j )}. Now if c j is not satisfied under f then man x(c 1 j ) has his last-choice partner, by construction of M . Hence (x(c 1 j ), c 1 j ) ∈ bp(M ). Moreover these, together with the n + m blocking pairs in X × Y and P × C identified already, are all the blocking pairs of M in I. Hence |bp(M )| = n + m + (m − t(B)), i.e. bp + (I) + t(B) ≤ n + 2m.
Conversely suppose that I admits a perfect matching M such that |bp(M )| = bp + (I). We form a truth assignment f in B as follows.
Since M is perfect, no person in Q ∪ Z can be involved in a blocking pair of M . Now let c j be a clause in C (1 ≤ j ≤ m). Exactly one woman c s j ∈ {c 1 j , c 2 j , c 3 j } has her last-choice partner in M . If (x(c s j ), c s j ) ∈ bp(M ) then the literal occurring at position s of c j is false. In such a case we claim that the same is true for every literal in c j . For, suppose not. Then there exists a true literal appearing at position s of c j . By construction of f , x(c s j ) has his first-choice partner in M . Let
Then M is a perfect matching in I and |bp(M )| < |bp(M )|, contradicting the choice of M . Hence the claim is established, so that clause c j is false under f . It follows that |bp(M )| = n + m + (m − t(f )), and therefore t(B) + bp + (I) ≥ n + 2m. From our earlier inequality it follows that t(B) + bp + (I) = n + 2m = 11 4 m, since 3m = 4n. Berman et al. [4] show that it is NP-hard to distinguish between instances B of max 
Preference lists on one side of length at most 2
We now consider instances of smi in which all preference lists on one side are of length at most 2. Let I be an smi instance in which U is the set of men and W is the set of women. Assume without loss of generality that every man has a list of length at most 2. Define the underlying graph of I to be a bipartite graph G = (V, E), where V = U ∪ W and E is the set of mutually acceptable pairs. Let n = |V (G)| and m = |E(G)|. Note that m ≤ 2 · |U| < 2n.
Define perfect min bp (p, q)-smi as follows. An instance of this problem is an smi instance I in which each man's preference list is of length at most p and each woman's preference list is of length at most q (p = ∞ or q = ∞ denotes unbounded length preference lists as before). A solution is a perfect matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs in I if I admits a perfect matching, or "no" otherwise.
Lemma 5. perfect min bp (2, ∞)-smi is solvable in O(n) time, where n is the number of men in I.
Proof. If |U| = |W| then the answer is no. Let I 1 = I the initial instance. If there is a woman in I 1 with an empty lists, then we output "no". If there is a woman w 1 with preference list that contains only one man, say m 1 then w 1 can be matched only to m 1 in a perfect matching. Therefore we add {w 1 , m 1 } to M , we remove w 1 and m 1 from I 1 and obtain an instance I 2 . We continue this process, if we find a woman in I i with empty list then we stop the algorithm with output "no" and if we find a woman w i with preference list of length 1 then we extend M with the pair (w i , m i ) and reduce the instance as described above. If for an instance I k there is no woman with preference list of length at most one then every man and woman must have a preference list of length 2 in I k , obviously. So the underlying graph of I k consists of a set of disjoint even cycles. Therefore, to achieve a perfect matching we can choose one from the two possible sets of edges for each of these even cycles. We make these decisions for each even cycle separately after counting the blocking pairs that contain some women in the cycle, for both cases, by considering all the edges of I. This last step can be done also in O(n) time since we have to go through the women's preference lists only once.
We continue with the related problem men-cover min bp (2, ∞)-smi. Here, we suppose that the preference lists of the men are of length at most 2, and the problem is to minimize the number of blocking pairs over all matchings that cover the men.
Lemma 6. men-cover min bp (2, ∞)-smi is solvable in O(n 2 ) time, where n is the number of men in I.
Proof. Suppose that the graph of the instance, G = (U ∪ W, E) is connected, otherwise, we can solve the problem separately for each component. If the number of men |U| is greater than the number of women |W| then we output "no". If |U| = |W| then we get an instance of perfect min bp (2, ∞)-smi. The connectivity of G implies |W| ≤ |U| + 1, so the last possible case is |W| = |U| + 1. Here, for every w j ∈ W we solve an instance I j of perfect min bp (2, ∞)-smi after removing w j from the graph. Note that if a matching M j is a minimum solution for I j then M j is also a minimum for I between the matchings that does not cover w j , since in those matchings in I, where w j is not covered, every man in w j 's list has only one possible partner. Therefore, we can get the optimal solution for I by solving |W| instances of perfect min bp (2, ∞)-smi and choosing the minimum of these solutions.
The problem women-cover min bp (2, ∞)-smi can be defined similarly. Here, we suppose that the preference lists of the men are of length at most 2, and the problem is to minimize the number of blocking pairs over all matchings that cover the women.
Lemma 7. women-cover min bp (2, ∞)-smi is solvable in O(n 3 ) time, where n is the number of men in I.
Proof. Let G = (U ∪ W, E) be the graph of the instance I and let bp(M ) denote the set of blocking pairs for a matching M in I. If there is no such matching that covers W then we output "no". Otherwise, we deal only with such matchings in this proof that covers W, so we assume this property hereby. Let bp int (M ) denote the set of internal blocking pairs for M , those blocking pairs that are covered by M . Furthermore, let bp ext (M ) denote the external blocking pairs, where the men are uncovered by M . Note
Our algorithm consists of two cycles. In the first one, we eliminate the external blocking pairs without creating any new internal blocking pair. In the second one, we try to reduce the number of internal blocking edges by switching pairs along augmenting paths and cycles. Finally, we prove that if neither of these steps is possible then the solution is optimal.
Eliminating the external blocking pairs. Claim 1: Suppose that for a matching
only u i and w j could be part of a new internal blocking pair. This is because (u i , w k ) cannot be blocking since either u i prefers w j if (u i , w k ) is blocking for M or (u i , w k ) is not blocking for M , and w j received a better partner so she cannot be part of any new blocking pair. Therefore, the set of internal blocking pairs can only reduce. We keep doing this elimination process until obtaining a matching M * such that bp int (M * ) = bp(M * ). This process must terminate, since the women get better and better partners after each elimination, so no pair can be eliminated twice. The final matching M * satisfies the required condition.
In order to obtain the O(n) running time for the elimination process we have to ensure that we can find the external blocking pairs efficiently. Here, we use the fact that if an uncovered men u l is not involved in any blocking pair for a matching M then he cannot be part of a blocking pair for M either, where M is obtained after eliminating an external blocking pair as described earlier. So we create a set N to collect such men that are uncovered by M k ∪ bp ext (M k ), where M k is the actual matching in the process. Let N be empty for the initial matching. Whenever we consider an uncovered man u i / ∈ N and we find that u i does not involved in a blocking pair then we add u i to N . So in each step we either eliminate an external blocking pair or we extend N until N contains every uncovered men. Therefore, the process terminates in O(n) time.
Reducing the number of internal blocking pairs. Let the alternating path P and alternating cycle C be defined as follows. For a matching M , a path P = {(u 0 , w 1 ), (w 1 , u 1 ), (u 1 , w 2 ), . . . , (u k−1 , w k ), (w k , u k )} is an alternating path if (w i , u i ) ∈ M and (u i−1 , w i ) / ∈ M for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. If u 0 = u k then we get an alternating cycle. Let M ⊕ P denote the matching obtained by switching the edges along the alternating path, i.e. by removing the edges (u i , w i ) from M and adding (u i−1 , w i ) to M for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Furthermore, let P W and C W be the women covered by P and C, respectively, and let 
It is enough to show that if w j / ∈ P W then w j cannot be involved in any new internal blocking pair for M ⊕P . Suppose indirectly that (u i , w j ) is a new internal blocking pair. If u i / ∈ P 0 U then u i is either uncovered by M ⊕ P or has the same partner as in M , so (u i , w j ) cannot be a new internal blocking pair. If u i ∈ P 0 U ∩ P U then (u i , w j ) = E(G) since u i has only two women in his list and both of them are in P W . Finally, if u i = u 0 = P 0 U \ P U then (u 0 , w j ) cannot be blocking since u 0 was uncovered by M and we supposed that no external blocking pair exists for M , a contradiction. We show that the construction of all possible alternating paths and cycles together with counting the number of new blocking pairs can be organised in O(n 2 ) time. Considering the alternating paths, we build up these paths from every uncovered man as follows. Let u be an uncovered men and w 1 1 be the first woman in his lists. We generate the first set of alternating paths starting from u as P 1
} for every k while no repetition occur in the sequence, by supposing that u 1 i = M (w 1 i ) and w 1 i is the other woman in u 1 i−1 's list beside M (u 1 i−1 ) for every i ≤ k. We can generate P 2 k , the second set of alternating paths starting from u, similarly. When we count the number of internal blocking pairs that are incident with the women of P 1 k (u) for the new matching M ⊕ P 1 k (u) we can use the fact that for a woman w 1 i , the set of internal blocking pairs remains the same in the matchings M ⊕ P 1 k (u) for every k > i and can differ only by the pair (
. Therefore, to count the number of blocking edges for every alternating paths P 1 k (u), we have to go through the preference lists of the women involved in the longest such path only once. Considering the alternating cycles, we try to construct an alternating cycle from every covered vertex u by building up the only alternating path starting from u as described above. If this alternating path returns to M (u) then we find the only alternating cycle in which u may be involved, denoted by C(u). Then we simply count the number of internal blocking pairs incident with the women involved in C(u) for M ⊕ C(u).
The optimality. The next claim indicates that if neither of the above improvements is possible then the solution is optimal.
Claim 3: Suppose that bp int (M ) = bp(M ) and there is a matching M opt such that |bp(M opt )| < |bp(M )| then there must be either an alternating path P such that
By Claim 1 we can suppose that bp int (M opt ) = bp(M opt ). Considering the symmetric difference of M and M opt we get some alternating paths, some alternating cycles and some pairs that remain matched in M opt too. Let P W and C W denote the set of women that are involved in an alternating path and an alternating cycle, respectively, and let R W denote the set of women who get the same partner in M and M opt . Furthermore, First we show that every women w j in R W must be involved in the same internal blocking pairs for M and M opt . Let us consider a pair (u i , w j ). If u i ∈ R U then (u i , w j ) is blocking for M if and only if it is blocking for M opt too, obviously. If u i ∈ DIF then (u i , w j ) / ∈ E(G) since u i has only two women in his list: M (u i ) and M opt (u i ), who are in P W ∪ C W . Finally, if u i ∈ P 0 U \ P U then u i is uncovered by M , so (u i , w j ) cannot be blocking since there is no external blocking pair for M . Similarly, if u i ∈ P U \ P 0 U then u i is uncovered by M opt , so (u i , w j ) cannot be blocking since there is no external blocking pair for M opt .
Therefore, if we sum up the internal blocking pairs according the sets of women involved in the same alternating path or in the same alternating cycle for M and M opt , then we get either an alternating path P or an alternating cycle C such that either
If for an alternating path
To verify this it is enough to show that if for a woman w j ∈ P W , (u i , w j ) is an internal blocking pair for M ⊕ P then (u i , w j ) is an internal blocking pair for M opt too. Note that M ⊕ P (w j ) = M opt (w j ), and u i is from the set of men covered by
U then u i is uncovered by M opt , so again, (u i , w j ) cannot be blocking for M ⊕ P since there is no external blocking pair for M opt .
Similarly, if for an alternating cycle C,
Conclusion of the proof. If a matching M is not optimal and there is no external blocking pair then Claim 3 implies that we can find an alternating path or cycle that satisfies the condition described in Claim 2, so by switching the edges along this path or the cycle the number of internal blocking pairs reduces.
The O(n 3 ) time implementation of the complete algorithm can be obtained as follows. In the first phase of the algorithm we eliminate the external blocking pairs in O(n) time as described in the proof of Claim 1. If their is no more external blocking pair then we try to reduce the number of internal blocking pairs by switching pairs along augmenting paths and cycles as described in Claim 2. This second phase can be done in O(n 2 ) time, and after each run, either the number of internal blocking edges reduces or we stop, since the solution was optimal. After the second phase we run the first phase again, since new external blocking edges may have been created, and so on. We repeat the first and second phases at most |W| times, since the number of internal blocking pairs for the initial matching is at most |W|. Therefore, we get O(n 3 ) for the overall running time of the algorithm. Proof. Let the bipartite graph be G = (U ∪ W, E), where every man in U has a preference list of length at most 2. First, we decompose G by using König's theorem. Let X ⊆ U and Y ⊆ W be such that X ∪ Y is a minimum vertex cover, whose size is equal to the size of a maximum matching of G. Let M be a maximum matching that covers X ∪ Y . Note that there cannot be an edge (x, y) in M with (x, y) ∈ (X × Y ).
Let U 2 be a subset of X such that for every u i ∈ U 2 there is an alternating path from some y ∈ Y to u i , and let W 2 = M (U 2 ). Furthermore, let U 3 = X \ U 2 , U 1 = U \ X, W 1 = Y and W 3 = W \ (W 1 ∪ W 2 ). We claim that W 1 ∪ W 2 ∪ U 3 is also a minimum vertex cover, moreover, the component restricted to the set of vertices U 1 ∪ U 2 ∪ W 1 ∪ W 2 is independent from the component restricted to the set of vertices U 3 ∪ W 3 . The fact that (W 1 ∪ W 2 ) × U 3 does not contain any edge is obvious by the definition of U 2 . There is no edge between U 1 and W 3 since X ∪ Y is a vertex cover. Finally, for every man u i in U 2 , both women in u i s list must be in W 1 ∪ W 2 by the definition of U 2 , so no woman in u i 's list can be from W 3 .
Therefore, we can obtain the solution for instance I of max size min bp (2, ∞)-smi by separately solving a problem of men-cover min bp (2, ∞)-smi for the subinstance restricted to U 3 ∪W 3 and a problem of women-cover min bp (2, ∞)-smi for the subinstance restricted to U 1 ∪ U 
Concluding remarks
In Table 1 we summarise complexity results for problems involving finding stable matchings and finding matchings with the minimum number of blocking pairs, in the context of instances of smi and sr. The table is split into columns according to these problems, and further according to whether the preference lists are strictly ordered or include ties. So far all preference lists in this paper have been strictly ordered, however ties arise in practice: for example a large hospital with many applicants may be indifferent between those in certain groups. The rows of the table refer to the case that we seek either a stable matching or a matching with the minimum number of blocking pairs; these rows are further split into the cases that the matching should be of arbitrary or maximum size.
In a given table entry, 'P' denotes that the problem in question is polynomial-time solvable, whilst 'NPc' denotes the NP-completeness of the related decision problem. Furthermore, '=0' denotes the fact that an optimal solution admits 0 blocking pairs, whilst '(*)' indicates that the complexity result is established in this paper. Indeed, the complexity result in the last row shown in boldface implies the result immediately to its right. Table 1 already indicates that the hardness results of Sections 2 and 3 also apply to the extension of smi to the case where preference lists may include ties. However it remains to extend the algorithms of Section 4 to this setting. Similar remarks apply if we are to consider the extension of the results to hr (and its generalisation hrt, where preference lists may include ties).
The inapproximability result established by Theorem 4 leaves open the question as to whether there is a c-approximation algorithm for max size min bp (3, 3)-smi, for some constant c > 1.
We conclude by mentioning an alternative way to minimise the instability of a maximum matching M in an instance of smi. As described by Eriksson and Häggström [5] , rather than trying to minimise |bp(M )|, one could try to minimise the number of people who are involved in blocking pairs of M . We can modify the proofs of the results in Sections 2 and 3 so that they hold for this variant of max size min bp smi (the details are omitted for space reasons), however again it remains to extend the results of Section 4 to this case.
